











The Role of Career
Concerns
Ruben Enikolopov
Working Paper  o 148
CEFIR /  ES Working Paper series
September 2010Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution:





Stronger career concerns induce appointed bureaucrats to adopt di⁄erent
policies than elected politicians. In particular, bureaucrats are less likely to use
targeted redistribution to achieve personal political goals. I use the example of
patronage jobs in local governments in the United States to provide empirical
support for this claim. I show that the number of full-time public employees is
signi￿cantly higher in local governments with elected chief executives. This dif-
ference increases during election years. In addition, consistent with the notion
that career concerns are especially strong for young bureaucrats, I ￿nd that the
number of full-time public employees increases with the age of appointed chief
executives. There is no such relationship in the case of elected chief executives.
1 Introduction
One of the central issues in political economy is how di⁄erent institutional arrange-
ments a⁄ect public o¢ cials￿ incentives and the policies they pursue. One such
arrangement is the method of selection of public o¢ cials, in particular, whether
they are elected or appointed. Although there is a strong theoretical argument that
di⁄erences in the method of selection should play an important role,1 the empirical
evidence about systematic di⁄erences in the policies pursued by appointed versus
elected public o¢ cials remains scarce.
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1E.g. Besley and Coate (2003) , Maskin and Tirole (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2007a, 2007b).
1In this paper, I focus on targeted redistribution as one example of a policy
that depends on whether a public o¢ cial is elected or appointed. Diversion of
resources from useful public projects to targeted redistribution and pork-barrel
projects is a widely recognized source of ine¢ ciency caused by the political process
(e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, Lizzeri and Presico, 2001). In this paper, I argue that
although both appointed and elected public o¢ cials are tempted to use targeted
redistribution to achieve their political goals, appointed public o¢ cials use it less
because of stronger career concerns.
I consider excessive public employment as an example of targeted redistribution
and use data from U.S. local governments to support this claim. One for of targeted
redistribution is selective transfers to narrow groups of voters designd to increase
the chances of staying in o¢ ce. It provides political bene￿ts to public o¢ cials by
attracting the support of its recipients. For elected public o¢ cials, it increases
the number of voters who support them during the elections. For appointed public
o¢ cials, it increases their chances of staying in o¢ ce by in￿ uencing electoral support
of the politicians who are responsible for their appointment.
However, if such transfers are ￿nanced from the same budget as public goods,
then targeted redistribution will result in underprovision of public goods. Inadequate
provision of public goods will result in dissatisfaction among voters not receiving the
transfers. It also harms the reputation of public o¢ cials as e¢ cient public managers.
In choosing the level of targeted redistribution, public o¢ cials take into account
not only its e⁄ect on their chances of staying in o¢ ce but also its e⁄ect on their job
prospects should they not stay in o¢ ce. For appointed bureaucrats, the next job is
more likely to be closely related to the current occupation, and it is relatively more
important to maintain a good reputation as e¢ cient public managers. Thus, as
long as career concerns are stronger for appointed public o¢ cials, they will be more
reluctant to use ine¢ cient targeted redistribution than their elected counterparts.
This notion is in line with Weber ([1904-1911] 1978) who underlined career-building
considerations as an important ingredient in bureaucratic e¢ ciency.
I provide a simple model to illustrate this logic and use data on public em-
ployment in U.S. local governments to test for empirical support for this argument.
Public employment can proxy for redistribution, because public employees receive a
wage premium over private employees at comparable levels (Ehrenberg and Schwarz,
1987; Gregory and Borland, 1999). Following Alesina et al (2000) I focus on the
level of public employment, rather than on wages. I show that directly elected chief
executives of local governments are more likely to use public employment for re-
distribution than their appointed counterparts. That is, elected chief executives on
average hire more full-time public employees. These results hold with and without
community ￿xed e⁄ects. For part-time employees who are less likely to be hired
2for political reasons, there is almost no di⁄erence among communities with di⁄erent
forms of government.
Next, I show that there are noticeable political cycles in the number of full-time
public employees in communities headed by elected chief executives, whereas this
is not the case for communities with appointed chief executives, or for part-time
employees. I provide additional evidence using data on the privatization of public-
service provision. Regardless of the form of government, privatization of a public
service decreases the number of public employees involved in the production of that
service, but increases the number of public employees involved in the production
of all other public services. The resulting e⁄ect of privatization on total public
employment is negative only in those local governments headed by appointed chief
executives. Elected executives ￿nd a way to privatize the provision of public services
without a corresponding decrease in the total number of public employees.
In analyzing the mechanisms that drive di⁄erences between elected and ap-
pointed executives, I also examine the relationship between the age of the exec-
utives and public employment. I show that for appointed chief executives there is
a strong link between the number of full-time public employees and the age of the
executive. Consistent with the career concerns explanation, I ￿nd that the younger
the appointed chief executive, the lower the number of full-time employees. There
is no such relationship for elected public o¢ cials, for whom career concerns are less
important. There is also no relationship between the number of part-time employees
and the age of the executive (whether appointed or elected).
Overall, the empirical evidence provides strong support for the claim that ap-
pointed bureaucrats are less likely to use targeted redistribution than elected politi-
cians and that this di⁄erence is, at least in part, driven by the di⁄erence in career
concerns.
Excessive public employment is a convenient form of getting electoral support in
exchange for transfers to a speci￿c group of voters. First, it allows the targeting of
transfers to speci￿c voters. Second, it permits public o¢ cials to disguise transfers
and to avoid opposition to targeted transfers (Alesina et al, 2000, 2001). Finally, it
helps to solve the double commitment problem prevalent in vote buying (Robinson
and Verdier, 2003).
Historically, U.S. local governments are notorious for the widespread use of pa-
tronage. Distributing public jobs was the cornerstone of political machines in charge
of city politics for many years. Politicians themselves admitted the use of patronage.
At a press conference, Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago told the journalists: ￿The
governor in his message last week said 36 percent of city employees were patronage,
and that is inaccurate, untrue and false. There is less than 8 percent.￿ 2 Thus,
2Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1969.
3patronage is a convenient example of targeted redistribution in the context of U.S.
local governments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses
the related literature. Section 3 presents a simple model to illustrate the argument.
Section 4 describes the empirical hypotheses. Section 5 presents results, and section
6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
According to the classical political economy theory, representative democracy pro-
duces the policy preferred by the median voter. Since bureaucrats are themselves
appointed by elected politicians, they should follow exactly the same policies as
directly elected public o¢ cials, so earlier literature suggested that the method of
selection of public o¢ cials has no e⁄ect on policy outcomes (Baron, 1988; La⁄ont,
1996). In particular, there should not be any systematic di⁄erences between cities
with di⁄erent forms of government (Deno and Mehay, 1987). More recent literature,
however, shows that the method of selection does play a role. According to Besley
and Coate (2003) direct elections allow voters to unbundle policy issues and thus
reduce the in￿ uence of the special interests. Maskin and Tirole (2004) argue that
politicians follow more closely the preferences of the general population compared
to their appointed counterparts, but are more likely to pander to public opinion
and choose popular actions even when they know that they are not in the general
interest of the society. A similar argument is developed in Vlaicu (2008). Alesina
and Tabellini (2007a, 2007b) provide a general theoretical framework to analyze the
criteria that guide the allocation of policy tasks to directly elected politicians or ap-
pointed bureaucrats. They argue that the main di⁄erence lies in their motivation.
Politicians care only about winning elections, whereas bureaucrats try to maximize
their perceived competence. They show that the preferable method of selection of
public o¢ cials depends on the features of the task they have to perform. These
two papers are very close in spirit to the argument in my paper, since maximizing
perceived competence is closely related to career concerns. However, in these papers
the main emphasis is made on the di⁄erence in the functional form of the objective
functions of politicians and bureaucrats, rather than the role of career concerns. In
addition, they do not provide empirical support for their theoretical argument.
Empirical studies provide evidence that the di⁄erence in the method of selection
of public o¢ cials does a⁄ect the policies they pursue. Fields et al (1997) demonstrate
that elected commissioners from the insurance industry follow more pro-consumer
policies than their appointed counterparts. Besley and Coate (2003) ￿nd a similar
e⁄ect in electricity regulation. There is also evidence that states with appointed
4judges have higher litigation rates (Hanssen, 1999) and lower levels of discrimina-
tion charges (Besley and Payne, 2003), as compared to states with elected judges.
Whalley (2010) shows that appointed city treasurers reduce a city￿ s cost of borrow-
ing.
Works comparing the performance of local governments headed by appointed
and elected executives were focused primarily on the di⁄erences in public spending
and produced mixed results, which are not directly related to the extent of targeted
redistribution.3 However, two recent papers are more closely related to the issue
of targeted redistribution. Levin and Tadelis (2008) ￿nd that cities with appointed
chief executives are more likely to privatize provision of public services, whereas
Vlaicu (2008) ￿nds pronounced electoral cycles in police o¢ cer hiring in mayor-
council cities that are absent in council-manager cities. The results in these two
papers are fully consistent with the claim that appointed chief executives are less
likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution and are discussed in greater details
below.
A number of works provide systematic evidence on the importance of the political
use of public employment in U.S. cities (Alesina et al, 2000; Riordan, 1994; Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2005) and southern Italy (Chubb, 1982). There are also theoretical
arguments for why ine¢ cient income redistribution through public employment in-
stead of direct transfers is used to get political support (Robinson and Verdier,
2003). Lopez-de-Silanes et al (1997) and Boyko et al (1996) demonstrate that the
decision of local governments to privatize provision of public services is to a large ex-
tent motivated by political patronage considerations. They show that privatization
is more likely if political bene￿ts from public employment are lower, e.g. if political
activity of public employees is forbidden.
An important issue for the identi￿cation strategy used in the empirical part
of the paper is the endogeneity of the form of government. There are very few
rigorous attempts to study the determinants of the form of government. Alesina,
Aghion and Trebbi (2007) show that ethnic fractionalization plays an important
role in determining electoral rules. I take into account their results by controlling
for ethnic fractionalization of the communities in the empirical analysis. To address
this problem in the paper, I provide several sets of results that are unlikely to be
driven by the endogeneity of political institutions.
3See MacDonald (2008) for the survey of such works. Two recent papers that provide the most
sophisticated empirical analysis also do not produce consistent results. MacDonald (2008) found
no di⁄erence, whereas Coate and Knight (2009) found that municipalities with appointed executive
have higher public spending.
53 Simple model
In this section I provide a simple model of public o¢ cial￿ s career concerns to illustrate
the intuition behind the empirical hypotheses. The model follows Holmstrom (1999)
analysis of career concerns. In the model a public o¢ cial chooses the allocation of
budgetary resources between provision of public goods and targeted redistribution.
Targeted redistribution increases public o¢ cial￿ s chance of staying in o¢ ce, but it
hurts public goods provision and, thus, has a negative e⁄ect on her career oppor-
tunities. As a result, the stronger are the career concerns, the lower is the level of
targeted redistribution.
There are two periods t = 1;2. Assume that there is no time discount. Each
agent serving as a public o¢ cial is characterized by two-dimensional ability ￿ =
(￿1;￿2); where ￿1 is the ability relevant for provision of public goods and ￿2 is
the ability that may be important for other jobs, but is irrelevant for public goods
provision. In the ￿rst period ability is unknown to everybody, including the agent.
The level of public goods provision in the ￿rst period depends on the relevant part
of the agent￿ s ability and the extent of targeted redistribution:




where q ￿ 0 is the level of targeted redistribution4 and " is noise (random variable
with mean zero and variance ￿2). Assume that the utility of the public o¢ cial in
the ￿rst period ￿ U does not depend on the extent of targeted redistribution. In
the second period the public o¢ cial either stays in o¢ ce or loses her job. If she
stays in o¢ ce she receives the same utility ￿ U. If not, she has to ￿nd another job
and the quality of the new job depends on her perceived ability. Assume that as
in Holmstrom (1999) the next-period wage is set by competition among principals
for the public o¢ cial￿ s services and equals to the market beliefs about the public
o¢ cial￿ s expected ability conditional on the realization of the ￿rst-period outcome
and the two dimensions of the ability are weighted, so that the utility from the new
job is ￿(y) = ￿E(￿1jy)+(1￿￿)E(￿2): Here ￿ re￿ ects how closely the skills required
at the new job are related to the skills necessary for the e¢ cient provision of public
goods. Assume that ￿ U > ￿(y) for all y, so that the public o¢ cial always wants to
stay in o¢ ce.
Targeted redistribution hurts public goods provision, but increases the chance of
staying in o¢ ce by attracting the votes of the bene￿ciaries of the redistribution. The
marginal negative e⁄ect of redistribution on public goods provision is negligible near
the optimum, but increases and at some point outweighs the bene￿ts of attracting
the votes of the bene￿ciaries of the redistribution. Thus, the probability of staying in
4In the case of public employment it can re￿ ect the number of excessive emplyees hired.
6o¢ ce is p(q) 2 [0;1];:where p(q) is a quasiconcave function with p0(0) = +1;p00(0) <
0; and p0(^ q) = 0 for some ^ q > 0: These restrictions guarantee that the problem has an
interior solution Thus, the public o¢ cial chooses the level of targeted redistribution
to maximize her expected utility
E[U] = ￿ U + p(q)￿ U + (1 ￿ p(q))E [￿(y)] (2)
In pure-strategy equilibrium the market anticipates that the public o¢ cial will









dq = ￿￿q: The ￿rst order condition for the agent￿ s problem implies that
p0(q￿)
￿￿ U ￿ E [￿(y)]
￿
= (1 ￿ p(q￿))￿q￿ (3)
Using implicit function theorem we can show that under the assumptions made
above the following proposition holds5.
Proposition 1
dq￿
d￿ < 0; so that targeted redistribution is lower if the skills required
at the next job are more closely related to the skills necessary for the provision of
public goods.
The e⁄ect of this perceived ability on job-market opportunities depends on the
type of jobs a public o¢ cial is likely to ￿nd after losing o¢ ce. The closer the skills
at the new job related to the skills required to run the government, the stronger the
e⁄ect. In particular, the e⁄ect is likely to be stronger for the jobs in the public sector
than for the jobs in the private sector. To provide empirical support for the claim
that career concerns are stronger for bureaucrats as compared with politicians, I
collect information on the career paths of the chief executives in U.S. municipalities.
I start with a sample of 558 elected mayors and 372 appointed city managers who
lost their o¢ ce between 2002 and 2007 according to information from Municipal
Yearbooks. Next, I use various internet sources (including e-mail communication
with local governments) to collect information on their next job. I was able to ￿nd
this information for 123 city managers and 69 mayors (see Table 1). The results
indicate that more than 90% of the city managers remain in the public sector and
almost 80% of them work as city managers in a di⁄erent city. Among mayors only
32% remain in the public sector, whereas 43% of them move to the private sector.
Thus, politicians often ￿nd a job which is not directly related to their work in public
o¢ ce, whereas for bureaucrats their next job is usually closely related to their work
while in o¢ ce.
5Second order condition for the interior solution implies that
d2E[U]















7These results suggest that for appointed chief executives their reputation as
e¢ cient public managers is more important to their career then for elected may-
ors. In terms of the model this means that ￿ is higher for bureaucrats than for
politicians,￿B > ￿P;6 and the negative e⁄ect of patronage on their job-market op-
portunities is likely to be higher. Thus, Proposition 1 implies that the level of tar-
geted redistribution should be lower for bureaucrats than for politicians, q￿
B > q￿
P:
4 Background information and empirical hypotheses
In the empirical analysis I use the data on public employment in U.S. local gov-
ernments. Depending on the form of local government, a chief executive can be
either directly elected or appointed by an elected council. In both cases, chief exec-
utives have substantial in￿ uence over public employment policies and can use it for
targeted redistribution.
4.1 Patronage
I focus on patronage as a speci￿c mechanism of targeted redistribution. Patronage
jobs are all those jobs that are distributed in exchange for electoral support and the
pay for which is greater than the value of the public services performed (Weingrod,
1968: 379; Wilson, 1961). Wage premium received by public employees suggests,
that on average their wage exceeds their marginal productivity, so that they are
earning a rent by working in a public sector (Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1987; Gregory
and Borland, 1999). Patronage provides a convenient way to make transfers. First,
it allows transfers to be precisely targeted. Second, it can disguise redistributive
policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes (Alesina
et al, 2000, 2001). Third, it provides a way to solve the commitment problem that
arises in vote buying (Robinson and Verdier, 2003). Politicians face a commitment
problem because policies which would induce people to vote for them are not in their
interests to implement ex post. Public employment can serve as a credible way to
promise a stream of bene￿ts as long as ￿ring public employees is costly. The latter
argument fully works only for full-times employees, since part-time employees can
be ￿red relatively easy.
The bene￿ts of patronage come from an increase in the number of votes from
public employees and, possibly, their friends and family. The cost of hiring an extra
employee comes from a decrease in the e¢ ciency of public goods production if the
pay for the job is greater than the value of the public services performed. This leads
to a loss of votes from all the citizens except for public employees.
6Similar e⁄ects will take place if appointed public o¢ cials care more about their perceived
competence because they care more about the assessment of their perfomance by professional peers
(Wilson, 1989: Chapter 9) or try to secure their autonomy and independence (Carpenter, 2001).
84.2 Forms of local government in the U.S.
In the U.S., local communities can choose their form of government in a local refer-
endum. For the purposes of the paper, I consider only one di⁄erence in the form of
government: whether the chief executive o¢ cer is elected or appointed.7 Local gov-
ernments with appointed chief executives include municipalities and counties with a
council-manager (administrator) form of government. In this type of government, an
elected council sets a policy, adopts legislation, and approves the budget. It appoints
a manager or administrator who has full responsibility of the day-to-day operation
of the local government and has authority to oversee department heads, hire and
￿re local governments￿sta⁄ (often including department heads), recommend policy
to the council and prepare the budget.
Local governments with elected chief executives include municipalities with a
mayor-council form of government and counties with a council-elected executive
form of government. In this type of government, an elected council serves as a
legislative body with a chief executive being elected separately. As in the previous
case, the council sets policy, adopts legislation, and approves the budget. The chief
executive implements the policies adopted by the council, prepares the budget, and
exercises some authority over day-to-day operations of the local government, the
extent of which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Thus, in both cases the authority to make the decisions related to public em-
ployment lies in the hands of the chief executive and the main di⁄erence between
them is the method of selection of the chief executive.8
4.3 Empirical Hypotheses
As long as career concerns are weaker for the case of elected public o¢ cials, we
expect the extent of targeted redistribution to be higher in the case of elected public
o¢ cials. As public employees receive a wage premium over private employees of
comparable levels (Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1987; Gregory and Borland, 1999), at
the margin public employment can be considered as a form of targeted redistribution.
So we expect the following hypothesis to hold for public employment in U.S. local
governments:
Hypothesis 1. The number of full-time public employees in local governments
7Communities with forms of government that can not be easily interpreted as headed by ap-
pointed and elected public o¢ cials are excluded from the analysis. These constitute approximately
one third of the total number of local governments and include municipalities with commission,
town meeting and representative town meeting forms of government and counties with commission
form of government.
8This is di⁄erent from the case of decisions regarding the size of the budget that are analyzed
in Coate and Knight (2009), since appointed chief executives have no de jure authority over these
decisions.
9headed by elected chief executives is higher than in local governments headed by
appointed chief executives.
This prediction relies on the assumption that without patronage there are no
systematic di⁄erences in the level of public employment between local governments
with appointed and elected chief executives. Clearly, there are many reasons why
this assumption may be violated. Appointed chief executives can be more e¢ cient
in public employment management, so that they can provide the same level of public
goods using fewer employees. Alternatively, appointed chief executives can be more
susceptible to the in￿ uence of special interests that lobby for higher expenditures
on purchases of equipment, services etc., at the expense of lower level of public
employment. For this reason I formulate additional empirical hypotheses that are in
line with the targeted redistribution story, but are not consistent with the alternative
explanations.
The main reason behind excessive number of public employees is that it increases
the chances of reelection for the incumbent politicians. These considerations are
especially important during election years. Thus, we should expect the di⁄erences
in the extent of patronage between appointed and elected executives to be especially
high during election years:9
Hypothesis 2.The di⁄erence in the number of full-time public employees in lo-
cal governments headed by elected chief executives is especially high during election
years.
The logic outlined above can be extended to make predictions about the rela-
tionship between privatization of public services provision and public employment.
The main argument for privatization is that it helps to achieve greater e¢ ciency,
primarily by cutting labor costs (Savas, 1987, Donahue 1989, Kemp 1991). Since
privatization should lead to a decrease in public employment, we expect to see less
privatization in communities headed by elected chief executives. The results of
Levine and Tadelis (2008) con￿rm this prediction. In addition, when public services
are privatized, we expect to see a di⁄erential e⁄ect of privatization on the level of
public employment. Public o¢ cials may privatize the provision of public services
without a corresponding decrease in public employment by reallocating public em-
ployees formerly engaged in the provision of the privatized public service to the
provision of other public services. If elected public o¢ cials are more concerned with
mitigating the e⁄ect of privatization on the level of public employment, the e⁄ect of
the number of privatized public services on the level of public employment should
9This hypothesis is closely related to the extensive literature on political business cycles. This
literature provides both theoretical reasons for the existence of political cycles (Rogo⁄ and Sibert,
1998; Rogo⁄, 1990; Persson and Tabellini, 1990) and empirical evidence (Drazen, 2000; Franzese,
2002; Ahmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004).
10be weaker in local governments headed by elected public o¢ cials. Thus, we can
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The decrease in the number of full-time public employees following
privatization of public services is smaller in local governments headed by elected chief
executives.
All the these hypotheses test whether appointed executives are less likely to be
engaged in targeted redistribution compared to their elected counterparts, but they
do not test whether this di⁄erence is driven by career concerns. As long as career
concerns of appointed bureaucrats play an important role in preventing them from
using targeted redistribution, we should expect to see less targeted redistribution for
younger appointed executives, since they have stronger career concerns (Holmstrom,
1982). For elected executives, for whom career concerns do not play an important
role, we should see a weak relationship, if any, between the age of the executive and
the extent of targeted redistribution.
Hypothesis 4. The number of full-time public employees is lower in communities
with younger appointed chief executives. In communities with elected chief executives




To compare the level of public employment in local communities with di⁄erent forms
of government I collect data on the form of government, local public employment
and various other characteristics of local communities for the years 1987, 1997 and
2002. More information on the data sources, variables￿de￿nitions and coverage
can be found in the Data Appendix. Summary statistics for the variables used in
the analysis are presented in Table 2. I restrict the analysis to communities with
a population above 30,000 inhabitants for two reasons. First, the sample is not
representative for smaller communities (see Data Appendix). Second, in smaller
communities endogeneity of the form of government is likely to a⁄ect the results. In
smaller communities mayors often work part-time and receive only symbolic remu-
neration, whereas hiring a city manager requires paying a competitive wage. Thus,
among small communities the form of government can be correlated with the wealth
of community, which can also a⁄ect public employment policies.
Out of the 1,546 local governments in the sample, for 764 governments the
information on the form of government is available for at least two years. Of these,
102 local governments changed their form of government (see Table 3). Out of 562
11local governments headed by an appointed chief executive, 47 local governments
changed their form of government to that of an elected chief executive. Out of 202
local governments that had elected chief executives, 55 local governments changed
their form of government to that of an appointed chief executive. For all the local
governments in the sample, changes in the form of government occur between 1987
and the subsequent years.
In the analysis of political cycles I use the data on the form of government an
election dates in the large U.S. cities.10, as well as information on public employment
and local ￿nance The sample includes yearly observations for 196 cities for the period
between 1987 and 2002. In this sample 107 cities have an appointed chief executive,
84 have an elected chief executive, and 5 cities changed their form of government
from appointed to elected chief executive.
To examine the relationship between the age of chief executive and the level
of public employment I collect information on the age of chief executives. For city
managers information was hand collected from the Who￿ s Who in Local Government
Management provided by ICMA. For mayors the information was collected from the
websites of the local governments. The resulting dataset contains information on
352 city managers and 270 mayors who were in o¢ ce in 2006-2007.
5.2 Level of public employment
To test Hypotheses 1, I compare the level of public employment in local communities
headed by elected and appointed chief executives. Changes in the form of local
governments allow me to conduct analysis using community ￿xed e⁄ects. The bene￿t
of such an analysis is that it allows controlling for the community characteristics
that do not change over time. The main drawback of this approach is that it limits
the analysis of the direct e⁄ect of the form of government to those communities
that have changed it during the period under consideration. Since the reasons for
these changes might be di⁄erent from the historical determinants of the form of
government in total population of the communities, I report the results both with
and without community ￿xed e⁄ects. I use the following panel model:
yit = ￿￿Electedit + X0
it￿￿ + ￿t + "it (4)
where yit is the logarithm of the number of public employees (either full-time or part-
time) in community i at time t, Electedit is a dummy variable that tells whether
the chief executive of the community i at time j was elected, ￿t is a period ￿xed-
e⁄ect, and Xit is a vector of covariates describing characteristics of community
j at time t; which includes the measures of population, income per capita, total
10I thank Razvan Vlaicu for generously providing the data.
12budgetary expenditures, level of unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of
population 65 years and older, fraction of population above 25 years old with at
least 12 years of education, and fraction of urban population, the number of years
since incorporation, a dummy variable that equals one for a homerule community,
and a dummy variable for the type of local government. In addition, depending
on the speci￿cation, the vector of controls includes either state or community ￿xed
e⁄ects. To take into account the panel structure of the data, the errors are clustered
at the community level. I also check whether the results of the regressions without
￿xed e⁄ects are robust to relaxing the linearity assumption by using nonparametric
matching estimation (see the subsection on sensitivity analysis below).
Since we can expect downward rigidity of public employment, the e⁄ect of a
switch from appointed to elected chief executive might be di⁄erent from the e⁄ect
of a switch in the opposite direction. For these reasons in the regression analysis of
the within e⁄ects I also use the following panel model:
yit = ￿￿BecomesElectedit + ￿￿BecomesAppointedit + X0
it￿￿ + ￿i + ￿t + "it (5)
where yit is a measure of public employment in community i at time j: The vari-
able BecomesElectedit equals one if in community i at time t the chief execu-
tive was elected, but previously the chief executive was appointed. The variable
BecomesAppointedit equals one if in community i at time t the chief executive was
elected, but afterwards the chief executive becomes appointed, X0
it is the same vec-
tor of covariates as described above, ￿i and ￿t are community and time ￿xed-e⁄ects
respectively.
Results of the estimation indicate that the number of full-time public employees
is signi￿cantly higher in communities with elected chief executives (Table 4). The
magnitude of the e⁄ect is large: the number of full-time public employees is higher in
communities with elected chief executives by 5 or 7 percent, depending on whether I
include communities￿￿xed e⁄ects or not. There is evidence that the number of public
employees exhibits downward rigidity: a change from appointed chief executive to
elected leads to a 9 percent increase in the number of full-time employees, whereas
a change from elected to appointed chief executive does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the number of public employees.11
If the di⁄erence in the level of public employment between appointed and elected
executives is indeed driven by political considerations, we should expect this di⁄er-
ence to be lower for part-time employees, since political bene￿ts from redistribution
towards part-time employees are smaller. First, the wage di⁄erential is likely to be
higher for full-time employees, since part of it comes from the fringe bene￿ts that
11Equality of the two coe¢ cients is rejected at 10% level of signi￿cance.
13part-time employees are not getting. Second, according to Robinson and Verdier
(2003) the level of excessive public employment is lower for public employees that are
easier to ￿re. For part-time employees the costs of ￿ring are signi￿cantly lower that
for full-time employees, since most of them have short-term contracts and cannot
claim the same bene￿ts as full-time employees if they are ￿red. Consistent with this
prediction, there is no evidence that the number of part-time public employees is
higher in communities with elected chief executives. All the results are insigni￿cant
and in three out of four cases have the wrong sign.
Overall, we ￿nd strong evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 that the number of
full-time employees is signi￿cantly higher in communities with elected chief execu-
tives. At the same time, the number of part-time employees is not a⁄ected by the
form of local government.
5.3 Political Cycles
I examine how the di⁄erence in the number of public employees between communities
with appointed and elected chief executives changes during the election years. I use
the following panel model:
yit = ElectionY earit￿Electedit￿￿ + Electedit￿￿ + ElectionY earit￿￿ + (6)
+ ~ X0
it￿￿ + ￿t + "it
where ElectionY earit is a dummy variable that equals one if in city i there were
elections in year t. For cities with elected mayors this is the year of mayoral elections
and for cities with appointed city managers this is the year of elections of the city
council responsible for the appointment of the city manager. The vector of controls
includes the measures of population, income per capita, total budgetary expendi-
tures, as well as the measure of taxes per capita.12 Standard errors were clustered
at the community level.
Results of the estimation are reported in Table 5. As in the results discussed
above, the number of full-time employees is signi￿cantly higher in cities with elected
chief executives. More importantly, the results indicate that the di⁄erence increases
by an additional 2 to 4 percent during the election years.13 Vlaicu (2008) argues
that the number of police o¢ cers can exhibit political cycles not because there are
12Other control variables used in the previous analysis could not be included in this analysis since
they are not available on a yearly basis.
13An increase in the di⁄erence comes primarily from the statistically signi￿cant increase in the
number of full-time employees in cities with elected chief executives. In cities with appointed chief
executives the number of full time employees seems to be decreasing during the election years, but
the e⁄ect is much smaller and insigni￿cant in the speci￿cation that does not control for city ￿xed
e⁄ects.
14patronage reasons, but because elected executives pander more to public opinion.
His argument is that public o¢ cials hire excessive number of police o¢ cers because
public safety is a salient issue and people felt strongly that a larger police force in the
streets was unambiguously good for their welfare. To take this e⁄ect into account
I exclude public employees involved in police protection. The results in column (3)
and (4) indicated that in this case the results remain basically unchanged. Similarly
to the previous set of results, if we look at the number of part-time employees instead
of full-time employees, we ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence either between cities with a
di⁄erent form of government or between election and nonelection years.
Overall, I ￿nd evidence in support of Hypotheses 2 : the di⁄erence in the num-
ber of full-time public employees between cities headed by elected and appointed
chief executives is especially high during the election years, primarily because of a
signi￿cant increase in the number of full-time employees in cities headed by elected
mayors. At the same time, for the number of part-time employees the di⁄erence is
insigni￿cant both in election and nonelection years.
5.4 E⁄ect of Privatization
To estimate the e⁄ects of privatization on public employment, I use the following
panel model:
yitg = ￿￿Electedit￿Privatizeditg + ￿￿Appointedit￿Privatizeditg + X0
itg￿￿ + "itg
where yitg is a measure of public employment in public service g (or in all public
services but g) in community i at time j, the dummy variable Privatizeditg tells
whether the provision of public services g in community i at time t is privatized,
Appointedit = 1 ￿ Electedit and ~ Xitg includes all the variables in (4) as well as
community, year, and public service ￿xed e⁄ects. Thus, in these regressions I look
at how privatization of a provision of a particular public service a⁄ects the number of
public employees involved in the provision of this public service (or public employees
involved in the provision of all other public services). To estimate the e⁄ect of
privatization on total public employment I use as the dependent variable yit ￿the
measure of the total number of employees in community i at time j. To separate the
e⁄ect of privatization from the e⁄ect of a change in the form of government I restrict
the sample to include only those cities in which the form of government remained
unchanged through the period under study.
Empirical results indicate that regardless of the form of government, privatiza-
tion of a public service leads to a decrease in the number of public employees involved
in the production of the privatized public service and an increase in the number of
15public employees involved in the production of other public services (see Table 6).
The e⁄ect on the total number of public employees, however, depends on the form
of government. In communities with appointed chief executives, privatization leads
to a signi￿cant decrease in the total number of public employees, whereas in com-
munities with elected chief executives there is no signi￿cant relationship between
privatization and public employment. In other words, only elected o¢ cials ￿nd a
way to privatize provision of public services without reducing the number of public
employees. Thus, the empirical results support Hypothesis 3.
5.5 Age of Chief Executive
All of the empirical evidence provided so far supports the notion that appointed bu-
reaucrats are less likely to be involved in making targeted transfers through public
employment, but does not shed light on the mechanisms that cause the di⁄erence.
To test whether the di⁄erence in public employment policy between appointed and
elected chief executives is indeed driven by career concerns, I examine the relation-
ship between the number of public employees and the age of chief executive. If career
concerns play an important role in limiting the extent of targeted redistribution by
appointed bureaucrats, we would expect that the number of public employees would
be higher for older city managers, for whom career concerns are weaker, as compared
with younger city managers, who face strong career concerns. For elected mayors,
however, we do not expect to see any association between their age and the number
of public employees, as for predominant majority of mayors career concerns consid-
erations do not play an important role in determining the extend of redistribution.
To test this hypothesis I use the following regression model:
yit = ￿￿Ageit + +X0
it￿￿ + ￿t + "it (7)
where Ageit is the age of the chief executive in community i at time t, and the
dependent variable yit and control variables Xit are the same as in (4).
Results of the estimation indicate that there is a strong positive relationship
between the age of appointed chief executives and the number of full-time public
employees (see Table 7). These results con￿rm the hypothesis that younger ap-
pointed chief executives are less involved in targeted redistribution. For elected
chief executives the relationship is not signi￿cant and has the opposite sign, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that for them career concerns do not play impor-
tant role in determining the extent of redistribution. At the same time, there is
no signi￿cant relationship between the age of either elected or appointed chief ex-
ecutives and the number of part-time public employees. One potential concern is
that the results are driven by the di⁄erences in tenure in o¢ ce of the appointed and
16elected chief executives. However, the results remain unchanged if we control for
tenure in o¢ ce, which does not seem to play any role in determining the number of
public employees.
The magnitude of the e⁄ects implies that ten years di⁄erence in the age of
city managers (which is slightly higher that the standard deviation of 7.4 years)
corresponds to a 7 percent di⁄erence in the number of full-time public employees.
Thus, a switch from appointed to elected chief executive, which leads to a 9 percent
increase in the number of full-time public employees, is equivalent to a switch to a
city manager who is 13 years older.
Overall, the empirical results con￿rm both Hypotheses 4 and 4a. These results
are especially important for the argument of the paper, since they provide evidence
that the di⁄erence in the extent of targeted redistribution between appointed and
elected public o¢ cials is indeed driven by the di⁄erences in career concerns. In
addition, it is much harder to come up with an alternative explanation for these
results that is driven by heterogeneity of the cities that choose di⁄erent forms of
government.
5.6 Sensitivity analysis
I check whether the results regarding the number of public employees are robust to
using covariates matching estimation instead of regression analysis. Since a large
number of covariates leads to a signi￿cant bias in simple matching estimation if
matching is not exact (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) I use a bias-adjusted matching
estimator (Abadie et al, 2004). Table AII reports the results of the matching esti-
mation. The results con￿rm that the number of full-time employees is signi￿cantly
higher in communities with elected chief executives. The di⁄erence in the number
of part-time employees becomes signi￿cant, but its magnitude is noticeably lower
than in the case of full-time employees. Since matching estimations do not take
into account the panel structure of the data, they are likely to underestimate stan-
dard errors of the estimated e⁄ects. To address this issue, I restrict the sample
to observations in each of the three years separately. For the number of full-time
employees the results remain signi￿cant in each of the three subsamples, whereas
for part-time employees the e⁄ect is much smaller and insigni￿cant, except for the
year 2002. In addition, I compare the results obtained using di⁄erent numbers of
matches. Increasing the number of matches does not a⁄ect the signi￿cance or the
magnitude of the results.
To see if the results are contaminated by the lack of overlap in the covariate
distribution between communities with appointed and elected chief executives, I
calculate the propensity score for all the observations based on the same set of
covariates as in the benchmark model and exclude those observations for which the
17propensity score is either smaller than 0.1 or greater than 0.9. After that I repeat
all the estimations on this restricted subsample. The results prove to be very close
to the results on the whole sample in terms of size and signi￿cance, so that the lack
of overlap in the covariate distribution does not a⁄ect the results.
To assess the unconfoundedness assumption for the matching results with com-
munity ￿xed-e⁄ects, I compare the level of public employment in 1987 in com-
munities that later on experience a change in the form of government with those
communities that do not experience such a change. I ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence
between such communities. Thus, there is no evidence that the unconfoundedness
assumption is violated. I also estimate the treatment e⁄ect on the treated using co-
variates matching, as well as propensity score matching. The results for the number
of full-time employees remain highly signi￿cant, but somewhat smaller in magni-
tude. The results for the number of part-time employees remain signi￿cant in the
case of propensity score matching, but lose their signi￿cance in the case of covariates
matching.
Vlaicu (2008) argues that the number of police o¢ cers di⁄ers between elected and
appointed chief executives not for patronage reasons, but because elected executives
pander more to public opinion. To see if this is the case I compare the number of
public employees separately for public employees working in police protection. and
for all public employees excluding those working in police protection. The results
indicate that the number of full-time public employees is signi￿cantly higher in
communities headed by elected chief executives even if we exclude public employees
in police protection (Table AIII). However, after controlling for community ￿xed
e⁄ects the di⁄erence is higher for full-time public employees in police protection.
Moreover, the di⁄erence is also signi￿cant for part-time public employees in police
protection. These results suggest that patronage considerations drive the di⁄erence
for all full-time public employees, but for public employees in police protection (both
full- and part-time) there is an additional e⁄ect described in Vlaicu (2008).
The set of covariates in the benchmark speci￿cation does not include the share of
privatized public services, since the privatization of public services is itself a choice
variable for the chief executives (Levine and Tadelis, 2008) that can be a⁄ected by
patronage considerations. I check whether the results are robust to controlling for
the extent of privatization. All the results preserve the same level of signi￿cance and
remain quantitatively similar after including the share of privatized public services
in the set of controls. In the estimation without community ￿xed-e⁄ects the e⁄ect
becomes stronger for both full- and part-time employees, whereas the di⁄erence
between them becomes somewhat smaller. There is no noticeable di⁄erence in the
results with community ￿xed-e⁄ects.
The results for the e⁄ect of privatization on the total number of employees are
18robust to the inclusion of community-service ￿xed e⁄ects. The results for the e⁄ect
of privatization of a public service on public employment in other services lose their
signi￿cance in this case. The same results, however, along with the results for the
e⁄ect of privatization of a public service on public employment in the same services,
prove to be robust to the inclusion of the community-year ￿xed e⁄ects.
Overall, the estimates prove to be robust to using alternative estimators and
additional controls.
5.7 Discussion of the results
Overall, the results provide strong support for the claim that the level of targeted
redistribution through public employment is lower for appointed chief executives
as compared to their elected counterparts. The most straightforward result is that
the number of full-time employees is lower in communities with appointed chief
executive. However, this result is subject to alternative explanations and does not
show the mechanism that leads to this di⁄erence.
The results for part-time employees, political cycles, and the e⁄ect of privati-
zation address the issue of potential alternative explanations. First, I rule out all
alternative explanations that predict similar e⁄ects for full-time and part-time em-
ployees, by showing that the number of part-time workers does not depend on the
form of government or whether it is an election year or not. These results, however,
are fully consistent with the explanation proposed in this paper, since part-time
employees do not play an important role in targeted redistribution. Second, I rule
out explanations that predict a stable di⁄erence in the level of public employment
between elected and appointed chief executives, by showing that the di⁄erence in-
creases during the electoral years. These results indicate that extra public workers
are especially important during electoral campaigns, which suggests that patronage
is indeed used for attracting votes. Third, I show that elected politicians not only
are less likely to privatize provision of public services (Levine and Tadelis, 2008),
but even if they do privatize, they accomplish it without a corresponding decrease
in the number of public employees. Taken together, these results provide evidence
in favor of the claim that in U.S. local governments public employment is used for
targeted redistribution and that the extent of targeted redistribution is higher in
local governments headed by elected public o¢ cials.
The last set of results is the most important for the main argument of the paper,
since it provides evidence on the mechanism that causes appointed and elected chief
executives to choose di⁄erent level of employment. The results show that there is a
positive relationship between the number of full-time employees and the age of ap-
pointed chief executive, but there is no association between the the number of public
employees and the age of elected chief executive. The results are fully consistent
19with the notion that career concerns are important for appointed bureaucrats, but
not for elected politicians. The younger the bureaucrats, the stronger their career
concerns and the lower the level of targeted redistribution. For elected politicians
career concerns are relatively weak, so that the level of targeted redistribution does
not depend on their age.
One potential drawback of the analysis is that I cannot fully control for the
endogeneity of the choice of the form of government. As long as the factors that
a⁄ect the choice of the form of government also a⁄ect public employment, this can
bias the results of the comparison of the level of public employment. By restricting
the sample to communities I take into account one such factor: among smaller
communities only the wealthiest can a⁄ord hiring a city manager. In addition, it is
less apparent how endogeneity of the form of government can drive the results for
political cycles, e⁄ect of privatization, and age of chief executives.
6 Conclusions
This paper compares the policies of elected versus appointed public o¢ cials with
regard to targeted redistribution. The results indicate that appointed public o¢ -
cials are less likely to engage in ine¢ cient targeted redistribution because they have
stronger career concerns. Elected politicians in U.S. cities are more likely to use
excessive public employment for targeted redistribution than their appointed coun-
terparts. Moreover, the extent to which appointed public o¢ cials are engaged in this
type of targeted redistribution depends on their age: the younger a bureaucrat, the
stronger are her career concerns, and the lower the level of targeted redistribution.
These results might be generalized to other settings in which public o¢ cials
can use ine¢ cient policies to gain popular support that would help them to stay
in o¢ ce. However, the argument in this paper is more relevant for the top ranked
than for lower level public o¢ cials. First, those at the top are more likely to have
opportunities to be engaged in targeted redistribution. Second, the incentives of the
lower-level public o¢ cials are likely to be systematically di⁄erent and to be much
more strongly a⁄ected by their relationships with immediate superiors in the party
or bureaucratic organization. In addition, the argument is most relevant for the case
in which bureaucrats expect to continue their career in a related line of business, so
that their professional reputation is an important consideration.
In the literature there is an ongoing discussion of the trade-o⁄ between elect-
ing and appointing public o¢ cials. There are many theoretical arguments for and
against each of the options. However, the empirical evidence to support these ar-
guments remains scarce. Besley and Coate (2003) have shown that appointed bu-
reaucrats are more likely to be in￿ uenced by special interests than elected public
20o¢ cials. I add to their results by providing empirical evidence in favor of appointed
public o¢ cials, showing that they are less likely to be engaged in ine¢ cient targeted
redistribution. Together, these results suggest that, in each particular situation, the
choice of elected versus appointed public o¢ cials can depend on the relative impor-
tance of the ine¢ ciencies caused by subversion of public policies by special interests
and by targeted redistribution.
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Data sources
The data on the form of local government (including counties, municipalities and
townships) comes from the 1987 Census of Governments, Government Organization
File by the U.S. Bureau of Census; Municipal Form of Government survey conducted
by International City/County Management Association (IMCA) in 2001; and Pro￿le
of Local Government Service Delivery Choices survey conducted by IMCA in 1997
and 2002. The data on the mode of provision of public services by local governments
comes from the 1987 and 2002 Census of Governments, Government Organization
Files by the U.S. Bureau of Census and Pro￿le of Local Government Service De-
livery Choices survey conducted by IMCA in 1997 and 2002. The data on public
employment and budgetary data come from the Employment Statistics and Finance
Statistics parts of the Census of Governments for the years 1987, 1997 and 2002.
The data on economic and social characteristics of municipalities and counties comes
from the Census of Population and Housing for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. I
exclude from the analysis communities with zero median household income. Two
communities (Holmedel, NJ and Spokane, WA) were excluded from the dataset due
to mistakes in the reported form of government. The ￿nal dataset is constructed
by merging the databases using unique FIPS places￿and MCD￿ s Census codes. A
small number of cases were merged manually due to typos in the original datasets.
Variables construction
The surveys distinguish ￿ve forms of municipal government (mayor-council, council-
manager, commission, town meeting and representative town meeting) and three
forms of county government (commission, council-administrator and council-elected
executive). Counties with council-elected executives and municipalities with mayor-
council forms of government are considered as having an elected executive. Counties
with council-administrator and municipalities with council-manager forms of govern-
ment are considered as having an appointed executive. Other forms of government
are excluded from the analysis. With respect to the form of government in the
Municipal Form of Government survey, I refer to the variable imis_FOG in the
database rather than the response to Question 1 in the survey based on the sugges-
tion by IMCA sta⁄. I check robustness of the results using the response to Question
1 in the survey instead and ￿nd no di⁄erence in the results.
The surveys that provide information on the method of provision of public ser-
vices ask whether a particular public service is provided by the local government
and what the mode of provision of the public service is. To describe the method of
provision of public services, I construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if
22the public service is contracted out. For public services that are not provided the
variable is missing. For observations from the Pro￿le of Local Government Service
Delivery Choices survey it equals one if the service is said to be provided only by
"Private for pro￿t￿ , and zero otherwise.
Since data on the method of provision of public services come from di⁄erent
surveys, I check for the comparability of these measures. For the year 2002 there
is some intersection between the Census of Governments and Pro￿le of Local Gov-
ernment Service Delivery Choices surveys which allows for such examination. The
intersection for the variable that describes the method of provision of public ser-
vices contains 635 observations for 134 local governments. The correlation between
the measures from the two datasets is 0.21 (signi￿cant at 0.01 level). In the ￿-
nal dataset, which contains observation only for the local governments for which
the variable describing the form of the government is not missing the intersections
contains 470 observations for 92 local governments and the correlation is 0.18 (sig-
ni￿cant at 0.01 level). The fact that I use dummy variables to describe the method
of provision of public services can explain relatively low levels of correlation. Thus,
the alternative measures of the methods of provision of public services provided by
independent surveys are robustly correlated and may be used jointly in our empirical
investigation.
In separating the employment by functions education services include all ele-
mentary and secondary education, as well as libraries; health and social services
include health, hospitals and welfare; environmental and housing includes housing
and community development, natural resources, parks and recreation, sewerage, and
solid waste management; government administration includes ￿nancial administra-
tion, judicial and legal, and other government administration; transportation and
transit includes airports, streets and highways, water transport and terminals, and
transit; utilities include water supply, electric power and gas supply.
Coverage
The data for the year 1987 is based on information from Census of Governments,
Government Organization File which contains information on all counties, munici-
pal and township governments (38932 observations). Some of the observations do
not contain all necessary information, but overall the sample can be considered as
representative.
The data for the year 1997 comes from the Pro￿le of Local Government Service
Delivery Choices survey. According to ICMA ￿The [1997] Pro￿le in Local Gov-
ernment Service Delivery Choice surveys were mailed in Fall 1997 and Spring 1998
to the Chief Administrative O¢ cers in municipalities with populations 10,000 and
over and to the Chief Administrative O¢ cers of counties with populations 25,000.
23In addition, a random sample of one in eight municipalities from 2,500 to 9,999
in population and one in eight counties with populations 2,500 to 24,999 and from
those local governments under 2,500 that are recognized by ICMA. Of the 4,952 mu-
nicipalities and counties that received surveys, 1,586 responded (32.0%).￿Thus, the
sample is biased towards large local governments and might not be representative
for the municipalities with populations under 2,500.
The data for the year 2002 comes both from the Pro￿le of Local Government
Service Delivery Choices survey and Census of Governments with information from
the Census of Governments being limited by the availability of information on the
form of local government, which comes from the Municipal Form of Government
survey. According to ICMA ￿The [2002] Pro￿le in Local Government Service Deliv-
ery Choices survey was conducted in Fall 2002 and Spring 2003. Letters were mailed
to the Chief Administrative O¢ cers in municipalities with populations 10,000 and
over, in counties with populations 25,000 and over, and to a random sample of one
in eight municipalities from 2,500 to 9,999 in population and one in eight counties
with populations from 2,500 to 24,999. Of the 5,370 municipalities and counties that
received surveys, 1,283 responded (23.9%).￿￿The 2001 Municipal Form of Govern-
ment surveys were mailed in Summer 2001 and Winter 2002 to the Municipal Clerks
in municipalities with populations 2,500 and over and to those municipalities under
2,500 in population that are in ICMA￿ s database. Of the 7,867 municipalities that
received surveys, 4,244 responded (54.0%).￿Thus, for the year 2002 the sample is
also biased towards large local governments and might not be representative for the
municipalities with populations under 2,500. There is also some evidence that the
sample is biased towards richer communities. Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2007)
analyze the di⁄erence between respondent and non-respondent municipalities in the
2001 Municipal Form of Government survey. They show that respondent and non-
respondent municipalities are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent in terms of ethnic division
and total population, but median income in the non-respondent municipalities is
somewhat lower with the di⁄erence being statistically signi￿cant.
Overall, the data for 1987 can be considered representative, whereas for 1997
and 2002 the sample is biased towards larger communities and may be considered
as representative of the population of relatively large communities (with populations
above 2500 inhabitants) and less representative of the population of smaller com-
munities. There is also some evidence that the sample is somewhat biased towards
richer communities.
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Table 1. Subsequent occupation of former mayors and city managers. 
Occupation   City Managers  Mayors 
 Number Percent  Number Percent 
Public office:  112  91.1  22  31.9 
City manager  98  79.7  0  0.00 
Other city office  2  1.6  8  11.6 
County office  6  4.9  4  5.8 
State office  1  0.8  5  7.2 
Federal office  0  0.0  3  4.3 
Other public office  5  4.1  2  2.9 
Self-employed 0  0.0  9  13.0 
Other private  7  5.7  21  30.4 
Non-profit 0  0.0  5  7.2 
Jail 0  0.0  2  2.9 
Retired 4  3.2  8  11.6 
Died 0  0.00  2  2.9 
Total 123  100  69  100 
The data for city managers and mayors includes information only for the municipalities 





Table 2. Summary statistics. 
N Mean Std.Dev.  N Mean Std.Dev. 
ln (Number of Full-time Employees) 1697 6.43 1.16 838 6.68 1.37
ln (Number of Part-time Employees) 1697 4.75 1.30 838 4.79 1.52
Age of chief executive 352 48.17 7.41 270 53.49 10.36
Tenure of chief executive 352 3.72 3.26 270 6.03 6.44
ln(Population) 1711 11.22 0.82 840 11.33 0.98
ln(Per Capita Income) 1711 9.43 0.54 840 9.19 0.50
ln(Expenditures) 1682 11.25 1.11 832 11.26 1.49
Urban 1711 0.84 0.31 840 0.78 0.36
Ethnic Fractionalization 1711 0.34 0.18 840 0.27 0.18
Inequality 1711 1.23 0.11 840 1.21 0.10
Unemployment 1711 0.06 0.02 840 0.07 0.03
Population over 65 1711 0.12 0.05 840 0.12 0.04
High School Graduates 1711 0.72 0.13 840 0.68 0.12
Years since Incorporation 1606 116.80 59.51 774 142.60 65.13
Homerule 1662 0.40 0.49 836 0.39 0.49
Privatized 1436 0.14 0.19 747 0.11 0.19
Appointed Chief Executive Elected Chief Executive
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Table 3. Changes in the form of local government across time.  
                   Total 
Number Percent 
More than one observation per community:  764  49.42 
Switched from Elected to Appointed  55  3.56 
Switched from Appointed to Elected  47  3.04 
Stayed Elected  147  9.51 
Stayed Appointed  515  33.31 
One observation per community:  782  50.58 
Elected 419  27.1 
Appointed 363  23.48 
Total 1546  100 
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Table 4. Effect of the Form of Government on the Number of Employees.  
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elected 0.068 0.063 0.049 0.044
[0.036]* [0.018]*** [0.023]** [0.024]*
Became Elected 0.088 0.088
After Being Appointed [0.039]** [0.039]**
Elected Before 0.010 0.001
Becoming Appointed [0.027] [0.031]
ln(Expenditures) 0.768 0.054 0.055
[0.025]*** [0.162] [0.163]
Y e a r   d u m m i e s N oN oY e sY e sY e sY e s
S t a t e - Y e a r  d u m m i e s Y e sY e sN oN oN oN o
Community fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Observations 2378 2358 1657 1646 1657 1646
Number of communities 1422 1411 653 653 653 653
R-squared 0.84 0.94 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elected -0.043 -0.035 0.014 -0.015
[0.066] [0.062] [0.105] [0.105]
Became Elected -0.105 -0.108
After Being Appointed [0.156] [0.155]
Elected Before 0.135 0.079
Becoming Appointed [0.152] [0.152]
ln(Expenditures) 0.600 0.598
[0.124]*** [0.124]***
Y e a r   d u m m i e s N oN oY e sY e sY e sY e s
S t a t e - Y e a r  d u m m i e s Y e sY e sN oN oN oN o
Community fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Observations 2378 2358 1657 1646 1657 1646
Number of communities 1422 1411 653 653 653 653
R-squared 0.52 0.58 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13
ln(Full-Time Employees) 
ln(Part-Time Employees) 
 Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parenthesis. Community controls include logarithm 
of  population, logarithm of income per capita, level of unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of 
population 65 years and older, fraction of population above 25 years old with at least 12 years of education, and 
fraction of urban population. In specifications (1) and (2) community controls in addition include the number of 
years since incorporation, a dummy variable for homerule community, and a dummy variable for the type of 
local government.. R-squared does not account for the contribution of community fixed effects. Only 
communities with population above 30,000 are included. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Electoral Cycles in the Number of Public Employees by Form of Government.  
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elected*Year of Election 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Elected  0.059 0.057 0.077 0.075
[0.028]** [0.026]** [0.039]** [0.039]*
Year of Election -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.002]* [0.002]** [0.003] [0.003]*
ln(Expenditures) 0.224 0.279
[0.050]*** [0.061]***
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2873 2873 2873 2873
Number of communities 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.24
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elected*Year of Election 0.038 0.038 -0.004 -0.004
[0.033] [0.033] [0.039] [0.040]
Elected  -0.572 -0.578 -0.574 -0.581
[0.460] [0.469] [0.444] [0.450]
Year of Election -0.026 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.024]
ln(Expenditures) 0.585 0.679
[0.228]** [0.207]***
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2873 2873 2873 2873
Number of communities 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
ln(Full-Time Employees)
 Excluding Police Protection All Public Services
ln(Part-Time Employees)
All Public Services  Excluding Police Protection
 Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parenthesis. Community controls include 
population, income per capita, and taxes per capita (all in logarithms). R-squared does not account for the 
contribution of community fixed effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Effect of Privatization on Public Employment. 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized*Elected -1.190 -1.184 0.038 0.041 0.037 0.090
[0.115]*** [0.115]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.061] [0.060]
Privatized*Appointed -1.308 -1.301 0.034 0.036 -0.064 -0.077
[0.078]*** [0.078]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.046] [0.039]**
ln(Public Expenditures) 0.094 0.281 0.266
[0.128] [0.056]*** [0.048]***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public service dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9579 9522 9579 9522 1975 1962
Number of communities 1333 1326 1332 1326 1350 1343
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.43
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized*Elected -0.376 -0.380 0.006 0.01 -0.426 -0.431
[0.085]*** [0.086]*** [0.053] [0.048] [0.575] [0.574]
Privatized*Appointed -0.634 -0.629 0.058 0.063 0.073 0.032
[0.055]*** [0.055]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.176] [0.168]
ln(Public Expenditures) 0.172 0.627 0.729
[0.097]* [0.178]*** [0.174]***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public service dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9579 9522 9579 9522 1975 1962
Number of communities 1333 1326 1333 1325 1349 1342
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.17
ln(Full-Time Employees) 
Same Service Other Services Total
ln(Part-Time Employees) 
Total Other Services Same Service
Only communities with population above 30,000 and constant form of government are included. In specifications 
(1) –(4) the unit of observation is service-community-year. In specifications (5) and (6) the unit of observation is 
community-year. Community controls include logarithm of  population, logarithm of income per capita, level of 
unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of population 65 years and older, fraction of population above 25 
years old with at least 12 years of education, and fraction of urban population. In (5) and (6) community controls in 
addition include the number of public services with non-zero employment. Robust standard errors clustered on 
community level in brackets. Errors are. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   34
Table 7. Effect of the Age of Chief Executive on the Number of Full-Time Public 
Employees by Form of Government. 
Community controls include logarithm of  population, logarithm of income per capita, level of 
unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of population 65 years and older, fraction of 
population above 25 years old with at least 12 years of education, and fraction of urban population. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of Appointed Chief Excutive 0.007 0.007
[0.003]** [0.003]**
Age of Elected Chief Excutive -0.003 -0.003
[0.004] [0.004]
ln(Expenditures) 0.657 0.657 0.899 0.897
[0.066]*** [0.066]*** [0.075]*** [0.075]***
Tenure in Office 0.002 -0.003
[0.007] [0.005]
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 341 341 210 210
Number of communities 260 260 126 126
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.96 0.96
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of Appointed Chief Excutive -0.005 -0.006
[0.011] [0.011]
Age of Elected Chief Excutive 0.004 0.008
[0.009] [0.010]
ln(Expenditures) 0.546 0.545 0.738 0.728
[0.112]*** [0.112]*** [0.097]*** [0.097]***
Tenure in Office 0.005 -0.019
[0.018] [0.013]
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 341 341 210 210
Number of communities 260 260 126 126
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.60 0.60
ln(Full-Time Employees) 
ln(Part-Time Employees)   35
Table AI. Description of the variables. 
Variable Description 
Elected  Dummy variable that equals one for counties with council-elected executive and 
municipalities with mayor-council form of government. It equals zero for counties 
with council-administrator and municipalities with council-manager forms of 
government. Missing for all other forms of government. With respect to the form of 
government in the Municipal Form of Government survey, I refer to the variable 
imis_FOG in the database rather than the response to Question 1 in the survey 
based on the suggestion by IMCA staff. Source:  Census of Governments (1987), 
Government Organization File; Municipal Form of Government (2001) and Profile of Local 
Government Service Delivery Choices (1997, 2002) surveys by International City/County 
Management Association (IMCA).  
Appointed  Dummy variable that equals one minus Elected. 
Became Elected after 
Being Appointed 
Dummy variable that equals one if the variable Elected equals one in the same period 
and zero in the previous period. Equals zero in all other cases when Elected is not 
missing. 
Became Appointed 
after Being Elected 
Dummy variable that equals one if the variable Elected equals zero in the same period 
and one in the previous period. Equals zero in all other cases when Elected is not 
missing. 
Full-Time Employees  The number of full-time public employees. Source: Census of Governments, Employment 
Statistics (1987, 1997 and 2002). 
Part-Time Employees  The number of part-time public employees. Source: Census of Governments, Employment 
Statistics (1987, 1997 and 2002). 
Privatized  Dummy variable that equals one if the provision of public service is contracted out 
and zero if it is provided in-house or by other government. For public services that 
are not provided the variable is missing. For observations from the Profile of Local 
Government Service Delivery Choices survey it equals one if the service is said to be 
provided by "Private for profit" only and zero otherwise. Source: Census of Governments 
(1987), Government Organization File; Profile of Local Government Service Delivery Choices 
(1997, 2002) survey by International City/County Management Association (ICMA). 
Share of privatized 
public services   Share of public services for which the variable “Privatized” (see above) equals one. 
Age of City Manager  Age  of  city  manager.  Source: Who is Who in Local Government Management database 
provided by ICMA. 
Age of Mayor  Age of mayor. Source: Hand-collected from the web-sites of the local governments. 
Population Total  population.  Source: Census of Population and Housing (1980, 1990 and 2000). 
Per Capita Income   Per capita income in dollars. Source: Census of Population and Housing (1980, 1990 and 
2000). 
Expenditures  Total budgetary expenditures of the local government. Source: Census of Governments, 
Finance Statistics (1987, 1997 and 2002). 
Inequality  Ratio of mean and median household income. Source: Census of Population and Housing 
(1980, 1990 and 2000). 
Unemployment Civil  labor  force unemployment rate. Source: Census of Population and Housing (1980, 
1990 and 2000). 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Probability that two people randomly drawn from a city will belong to different 
ethnic groups. I distinguish six ethnic groups: white, black, Hispanic, American 
Indians and Alaskan, Asian-Pacific, and others. Source: Census of Population and Housing 
for (1980, 1990 and 2000).   36
Variable Description 
Population  over  65  Fraction of population 65 years or older. Source:  Census of Population and Housing 
(1980, 1990 and 2000). 
High School Graduates  Fraction of population above 25 years old with at least 12 years of education. Source: 
Census of Population and Housing (1980, 1990 and 2000). 
Urban  Fraction of urban population. Source: Census of Population and Housing (1980, 1990 and 
2000). 
Budget Deficit  Difference between government total expenditures and total revenues as a share of 




Number of years since the incorporation of the local government. Source: Census of 
Governments (1987), Government Organization File 
Homerule  Dummy variable that equals one for homerule local governments. Source: Census of 
Governments (1987), Government Organization File 
County  Dummy variable that equals one for counties and zero for municipalities and 
townships.  
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Table AII. Estimates using nearest neighbor matching.  
 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in brackets. The average treatment effect is reported. 
Covariates include measures of population, income per capita, total budgetary 
expenditures, level of unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of population 65 
years and older, fraction of population above 25 years old with at least 12 years of 
education, fraction of urban population, years since incorporation and dummy variables 
for homerule. Matching on year and type of community is exact. Only communities with 
population above 30,000 are included.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
[4.01]*** [4.48]*** [4.56]*** [4.68]***
0.080 0.091 0.088 0.090
[2.36]** [3.04]*** [3.09]*** [3.25]***
0.138 0.134 0.129 0.128
[2.53]** [2.47]** [2.39]** [2.36]**
0.144 0.154 0.160 0.157
[2.44]** [2.94]*** [3.09]*** [3.08]***
0.018 0.022 0.008 0.006
[0.28] [0.42] [0.16] [0.13]
0.026 0.009 -0.004 -0.009
[0.41] [0.15] [0.06] [0.15]
-0.109 -0.064 -0.049 -0.038
[0.57] [0.44] [0.36] [0.28]
0.176 0.151 0.142 0.145











Table AIII. Effect of the Form of Government on the Number of Police and Non-
Police Public Employees.  
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elected 0.079 0.041 -0.047 -0.043
[0.021]*** [0.028] [0.070] [0.102]
Became Elected 0.080 -0.195
After Being Appointed [0.048]* [0.159]
Elected Before 0.002 0.106
Becoming Appointed [0.034] [0.140]
Year  dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State-Year dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Community fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Y Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2354 2509 2509 2354 2509 2509
Number of communities 1409 1518 1518 1409 1518 1518
R-squared 0.93 0.30 0.30 0.57 0.15 0.15
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elected -0.014 0.075 -0.072 0.238
[0.045] [0.030]** [0.086] [0.134]*
Became Elected 0.143 0.310
After Being Appointed [0.043]*** [0.185]*
Elected Before 0.009 0.167
Becoming Appointed [0.043] [0.214]
Year  dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State-Year dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Community fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Community controls Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 2354 2509 2509 2354 2509 2509
Number of communities 1409 1518 1518 1409 1518 1518
R-squared 0.68 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.03 0.03
ln(Full-Time Employees)  ln(Part-Time Employees) 
Employees in Police Protection Only
Employees Excluding Police Protection
ln(Full-Time Employees)  ln(Part-Time Employees) 
Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parenthesis. Community controls in all regressions 
include logarithm of population, logarithm income per capita, logarithm total budgetary expenditures, level of 
unemployment, ethnic fractionalization, fraction of population 65 years and older, fraction of high school 
graduates, fraction of urban population. Regressions (1) and (4) also include years since incorporation and dummy 
variables for county and homerule. R-squared does not account for the contribution of community fixed effects. 
Only communities with population above 30,000 are included. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 